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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE "NEW
ECONOMIC REALISM" OF SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
by
Miles W. Kirkpatrick*
and
Stephen Paul Mahinka**

S ECTION 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate acquisitions "where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."' The body of antitrust doctrine relating to mergers' between

competing or potentially competing firms which has developed in the
interpretation and application of the Delphic language of this statute has

hardly been a model of clarity.' The initial judicial decisions in the area
provided little in the way of either reasons or rules.' The Supreme Court
responded to the uncertainty and the criticism which these decisions engen-

dered by developing a series of very clear rules.' The announced rules, while
providing a measure of predictability, failed to provide a clearly articulated or
convincing rationale. Although it is currently unclear whether the shape of
merger jurisprudence will be significantly altered by the Burger Court, three
recent decisions have led many in the antitrust community to conclude that

there has been a change in the Supreme Court's view of corporate mergers.
That there has been some change cannot be doubted. The question is, what
is the degree of shift in judicial attitudes represented by these opinions? Do
they portend a significant change or merely a minor shift in emphasis?

Further, if these new decisions do signal a shift toward a "new economic

realism" 5 by the Court, is the body of economic doctrine to be relied upon
* A.B., Princeton University; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania. Attorney-at-law,
Washington, D.C. Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 1970-1973.
** A.B., The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., Harvard University. Attorney-at-law,
Washington, D.C.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2. Cf. the reviews of the § 7 decisions of the Warren Court inFox, Antitrust, Mergers, and

the Supreme Court: The Politics of Section 7of the Clayton Act, 26 MERCER L. REV. 389,396-410
(1975); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribu-

tion, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 299-313
(1975). See also Areeda, Structure-Performance Assumptions in Recent Merger Cases, in PUBLIC
POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 27 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969).
3. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), with United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
4. See, e.g., the structural market test of illegality adopted in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 321 (1963). See also text accompanying note 47 infra.
5. The phrase refers to the explicit utilization of and reliance upon economic data and
concepts in antitrust decision-making. Cf. Fox, supra note 2, at 390 & n.4.
In recent years the explicit application of economic concepts to legal problems has become
quite prevalent. Much of the controversy over the utility of this approach has centered around
Professor Posner's pioneering treatment. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
For critical reaction see, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA.L. REV. 451 (1974); Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product:
A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974). For a
response see Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 757 (1975).
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coherent and widely accepted? As the senior author of this Article has
recently observed, "the economic content and theoretical underpinnings of
antitrust cases have historically been more significant than in other fields of
law." 6 To the extent that economic doctrine in this area is in a state of flux,
considerable difficulty may be expected from an explicit and intrusive
economic analysis in anti-merger cases.
The three new judicial decisions at issue are United States v. General
Dynamics Corp.,' United States v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc. ,8and United
States v. Connecticut National Bank.9 As these decisions are quite well
known, the factual situations will be sketched only briefly. This Article will
then address the possible implications of the "new economic realism," which
some have seen as implicit in these decisions, on governmental and private
enforcement activity under section 7.
In United States v. General Dynamics Corp. the Court upheld a horizontal
merger of two coal producers, each of which enjoyed a substantial share of a
concentrated market. The Government proved that a small number of leading
companies dominated the coal producing industry, that there had been a trend
toward increasing concentration, and that the merger significantly enhanced
the acquiring company's market share."° While the Court acknowledged that
under prior horizontal merger decisions this statistical showing was sufficient
to make out a case of illegality, I the Court reached back to the decision in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 2 decided twelve years earlier, for the
proposition that while market-share percentages are "the primary index of
market power . . . only a further examination of the particular market-its
structure, history and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting
for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."' 3
The Court held that while the Government's statistical showing might have
been sufficient to support a finding of "undue concentration" in the absence
of other considerations, the district court was justified in finding that other
pertinent factors affecting the coal industry and the defendants' business
mandated a conclusion that no substantial lessening of competition occurred
or was threatened by the acquisition. 4 The acquired company, United
Electric, did not have sufficient coal reserves, a key factor in measuring a coal
producer's market strength, to make it a significant competitive force.
Therefore, in terms of probable future ability to compete, rather than in terms
of past production on which the Government relied, the district court's
6. Kirkpatrick, Book Review, to be published in vol. 76 of Columbia Law Review. See also
Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1,2; cf. Bok, Section 7of the
Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).
7. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
8. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
9. 418 U.S. 656 (1974). There has been extensive discussion of these cases and their import.
In addition to the sources cited infra see Horsley, Marine Bancorporation, Connecticut National
Bank and Potential Competition: A Critique, 55 B.U.L. REV. 3 (1975); Meigher, Bank Mergers
and the Clayton Act: Some Chips in the Doctrine of Potential Competition, 16 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 705 (1975); Moyer, United States v. General Dynamics Corporation: An Interpretation,

20

ANTITRUST BULL.

1(1975).

10. 415 U.S. at 494-96.
I. Id. at 497-98.

12. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
13. Id.at 322 n.38, quoted in415 U.S. at 498.
14. 415 U.S. at 498.
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conclusion that the merger did not violate section 7 of the Act was

warranted.15
Thus, the relevant statistical inquiry was on "uncommitted reserves of
recoverable coal," because those were the sources of future competitive

potential. Under that standard the Government failed to show that the
acquired company had sufficient reserves to compete effectively for long-

term contracts or that the firm might obtain new reserves. The Court
conceded that the Government had raised the possibility that United Electric
might obtain deep-mine or other strip-mine reserves, but relied on the district
court's finding that such reserves were not presently available. 16 Moreover,
the Court concluded:
The mere possibility that United Electric, in common with all other

companies with the inclination and the corporate treasury to do so, could
some day expand into an essentially new line of business does not
depreciate the validity of the conclusion that United Electric at the time
of the trial did not have the power to compete on a significant scale for the
procurement of future long-term contracts, nor does it vest in the
production statistics relied on by the Government more significance than
ascribed to them by the District Court. 7

Three months after the decision in General Dynamics the Supreme Court
handed down decisions in two bank merger cases

competition

doctrine.' 9

8

involving the potential

The Burger Court decided United States v. Marine

Bancorporation,Inc. by affirming the judgment for defendants, but vacated

and remanded the district court determination in UnitedStates v. Connecticut
National Bank.

In Marine Bancorporation the Government challenged the acquisition of a
state-chartered bank, the third largest bank in the concentrated Spokane,
Washington, market, by a large nationally-chartered bank whose principal
office was located in Seattle, Washington. The Government charged that the
merger (1) eliminated the likelihood that the acquiring bank would have
15. Id. at 501-04.
16. Id. at 509.
17. Id. at 509-10.
18. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v.
Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
19. The potential competition doctrine developed in a line of merger cases under section 7.
The doctrine proscribes a merger either where a dominant firm within a market is acquired by an
outside firm that would enter the market under existing conditions even if the acquisition were
not permitted, or where a firm within a concentrated market is acquired by a firm outside the
market that would not enter under current conditions but would enter if profits increased
sufficiently, thus exerting a pro-competitive effect through its existence on the edge of the
market. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407 (E.D.
Mich. 1968), aff'd, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). The doctrine has generated numerous commentaries
among which the most useful are: P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES 255-87
(1975); Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 354-61 (1967); Hood, Potential Competition, 21
ANTITRUST BULL. 485 (1976); Posner, supra note 2, at 313-25; Robinson, Antitrust Developments:
1973, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 163, 180-90 (1974); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362-86 (1965); Comment, The Potential Competition
Doctrine After Marine Bancorporation, 63 GEO. L.J. 969 (1975). See also the discussion of
toehold acquisitions, note 61 infra.
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entered the Spokane market de novo or by toehold acquisition; (2) ended the
acquiring bank's present pro-competitive effect on the edge of the Spokane
commercial banking market; and (3) ended the probability that the acquired
bank would have developed independently or by smaller acquisitions into a
regional and ultimately statewide actual competitor of the acquiring bank as
well as other large banks. 21 In an opinion by Justice Powell the Court held that
in applying the potential competition doctrine to commercial banking "courts
must take into account the extensive federal and state regulation of banks,
2 1
particularly the legal restraints on entry unique to this line of commerce."
The legal barriers to entry into the banking market in Washington, notably a
state law prohibition against de novo branching, against branching from a
branch office, and against multi-bank holding companies, compelled the
Court to conclude that the challenged merger was not in violation of section 7
2
of the Clayton Act.1
As to the question of geographic markets, the Court ruled that only the
Spokane metropolitan area was relevant, and rejected the Government's
contrary contention that the entire state was the relevant market. The Court
noted that in prior section 7 cases "section of the country" had been
consistently equated with "relevant geographic market," a term which has
traditionally been defined as the area in which the goods or services are
marketed by the acquired firm. 23 Thus, while there may be several relevant
geographic markets, each must be shown to be an "area in which the acquired
firm is an actual, direct competitor. '24 The Court also concluded that the
Government's state-wide approach was "simply too speculative on this
record," 25 particularly since section 7 deals in " 'probabilities' not 'ephemeral possibilities.' ",26 Although the market concentration ratios in Marine
Bancorporationwere high, thereby justifying a presumption that the market
was not vigorously competitive, the Court stated clearly that the defendant
banks nevertheless were entitled to attempt to prove that "the concentration
ratios . . did not accurately depict the [market's] economic characteristics
....
,,27 In this connection Justice Powell cited General Dynamics for the
proposition that such statistics "can be unreliable indicators of actual market
behavior." ' 28 Finally, in light of the legal barriers preventing entry into the
Washington banking market, the Court held that the Government failed to
sustain the burden of proof that the challenged merger violated section 7 since
neither of the proposed alternative methods of entry, de novo or a foothold
acquisition of a small state bank in the Spokane area, was feasible or offered a
20. 418 U.S. at 632-41. The first theory of illegality had been expressly left open the year
before in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973). The Court again
declined to reach the question. 418 U.S. at 639.
21. 418 U.S. at 606.
22. Id.
23. 418 U.S. at 620-23; see, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 527
(1973); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447 (1964); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
24. 418 U.S. at 622.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 623, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
27. 418 U.S. at 631.
28. Id.
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substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration in the Spokane
market or other significant pro-competitive effects.2 9
In Connecticut National Bank the Government challenged a proposed
consolidation of the fourth and the eighth largest commercial banks operating
in adjoining regions of Connecticut. The Court vacated and remanded the
decision of the district court and relied on Marine Bancorporation,decided
the same day, to hold that the relevant geographic market was not the state as
a whole. 30 The Court noted that the Government had the burden to produce
evidence defining localized banking markets. 3'
The interesting question concerning these decisions is not the impact of
these cases on coal markets or on mergers in the banking field or on other
fields in which entry is regulated. Rather, the question is whether these cases
demonstrate a change in the outlook of the new Supreme Court majority
toward section 7 of the Clayton Act. Do these decisions indicate a change in
the nature of the questions asked concerning the legality of corporate
mergers? Are the standards of illegality to be applied in merger cases to be
significantly changed? In short, is there, as Justice White, dissenting in
Marine Bancorporation,feared, a "new antitrust majority" with a significantly different outlook and approach to section 7 of the Clayton Act?32
These cases need not be read as having far-reaching consequences. General
Dynamics, for example, is hardly a run-of-the-mill horizontal merger case.
The limited supply situation and the requirements contract method of marketing, standard in the coal industry, are not typical. In addition, United Electric
was in an unusual competitive position, having committed virtually all its coal
reserves by long-term contracts. 33 Therefore, the case can be read narrowly
as a unique application of section 7 with little precedential significance.
Support for this view "can be inferred from the absence of any express
disagreement on the majority's part with any of the Court's earlier section 7
decisions." 34 Similarly, the analysis set forth in the bank merger cases could
easily be viewed as limited to commercial banking or to other industries with
regulated growth potential.35 A strong argument may be made, however, that
in the past two or three years, with the Warren Court majority becoming the
Burger Court minority, the judicial attitude toward interpretation of section 7
of the Clayton Act has shifted toward a "new economic realism." 36 In the
view of several distinguished commentators in the antitrust area these cases
may herald a new approach to section 7, and a new and higher threshold of
37
illegality.
29. Id. at 638-39.
30. 418 U.S. at 666.
31. Id. at 669-70.
32.

418 U.S. at 642 (white, J., dissenting).

33.

415 U.S. at 501-04. See Note, The Development of the Sherman Act Section 2 Market

Share Test and Its Inapplicability to Dynamic Markets, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 153, 204 n.246 (1975).
34.

Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 246 (1975). For

this view see Knapp, General Dynamics: Mirage or Oasis ?,26 MERCER L. REV. 577, 589 (1975);
Kramer, Economic Concentration and the Antitrust Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 165,

177;

Williams, Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 26 MERCER L. REV. 963 (1975).
35. For this view see Comment, supra note 19, at 979.
36. See note 5 supra. There is no reason to suspect that the appointment of Justice Stevens
will reverse this apparent trend.
37. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 2, at 390,413; Posner, supra note 2, at 310-I; Robinson, supra
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At a minimum, these decisions indicate that the Warren Court's strict
enforcement approach has been diluted. The stark fact is that General
Dynamics and Marine Bancorporationare decisions squarely against the
Government. 38 If the "new antitrust majority" proceeds in the manner
foreshadowed by these decisions, then the desirability of corporate mergers
may be evaluated much more favorably, and, as a consequence, a private or
governmental plaintiff may be required to prove with greater certainty that
the merger probably will cause measurable or objectively probable anti39
competitive effects.
This apparent shift in point of view has several significant implications. The
most important are that the shift diminishes the predictability of the legality of
a particular merger and escalates the plaintiffs' burdens as fewer presumptions may be made in the plaintiffs' favor. Should economic inquiry become
more far-reaching, anti-merger activity will be more time-consuming, more
costly, and more difficult. Should this new economic emphasis become the
direction of future merger analysis, an increase in types and complexity of the
economic data that must be produced by either governmental or private
plaintiffs will result, and the ultimate effect will be to place defendants in a
more favorable position.
Some indication of the potential consequences of a shift in outlook may be
gleaned by a comparison of the analysis used in these new decisions with the
traditional antitrust analysis of mergers by the Warren Court. The first
opinion handed down by the Supreme Court under the amended section 7 was
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,4' in which the Court unanimously held that
Brown Shoe Company's merger with G.R. Kinney Company violated section
7. Rather than attempting to formulate a definite standard of illegality, the
Court enumerated a disparate set of relevant factors, 4 including congressional concern with the "rising tide of economic concentration. 4 2The Court
also stressed that Congress wanted to prevent only those mergers "having
demonstrable anticompetitive effects," noting that the statute's concern was
"with the protection of competition, not competitors ....
,,43
The Court
concluded that Congress had rejected any simple rule of illegality, but noted
that congressional deliberations reflected the "conscious avoidance of exclusively mathematical tests."" As one distinguished commentator, Professor
Posner, observed, "in Brown Shoe. . .one has no sense that the Court has
any notion of how a nonmonopolistic merger might affect competition." 45
note 34, at 259; Victor, Subdivisions, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint Ventures, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 749, at A-14 (Feb. 3, 1976). See also Posner, The Supreme Court
and Antitrust Policy: A New Direction?,44 ANTITRUST L.J. 141 (1975).

38. Justice Stewart, reviewing the unbroken series of government victories in the Supreme
Court under the amended §7, was moved to comment that the "sole consistency... in litigation
under §7 [is that] the Government always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
39. See Fox, supra note 2, at 423.
40. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

316-23.
317.
319-20 (emphasis in original).
321 n.36.

45. Posner, supra note 2, at 304. Professor Kauper, formerly Chief of the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, has referred to Brown Shoeas "perhaps... the most radical of the

1976]

CLA YTON ACT

Although it followed Brown Shoe by only a year, the Court's opinion in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 46 rested on a much different
concept of section 7. While the Court in Brown Shoe rejected any simple
quantitative test of illegality, fhe Court in PhiladelphiaNational Bank cited
several factors motivating the adoption of a structural market test of illegality, including the desire "to avoid the difficulties of dealing with the complex
and elusive pertinent economic data, to provide the predictability needed for
business planning, and to avoid overly broad economic investigations that
might subvert the congressional intent that antitrust questions be resolved
expeditiously." 4 7 Therefore, the Court declared that a merger which (1)
created a firm having thirty percent of the market, and (2) thereby increased
concentration among the leading firms by at least one-third, was presumptively unlawful. 4 8 Only three years later, the Court ignored the test espoused
in Philadelphia National Bank and held in United States v. Von's Grocery
Co.4 9 that the acquisition of a retail grocery supermarket chain was a violation
of section 7, even though the market was competitive and fragmented. There
had been a marked decline in the number of independent small firms, a fact
which the Court emphasized by stating that "the basic purpose of the
[Clayton Act] was to prevent concentration in the American economy by
keeping a large number of small competitors in business." 5
Such analyses, while inconsistent and lacking a coherent economic
rationale, do have the common aspect of favoring the imposition of liability
under section 7. This series of decisions, providing plaintiffs with a virtual
presumption of illegality regarding challenged mergers, was apparently
5
'
impaired by the decisions in GeneralDynamicsand MarineBancorporation.
If the single outstanding characteristic of section 7 law prior to the advent of a
"new antitrust majority" was "the extent to which the courts were willing to
draw inferences of anti-competitive effect from the evidence which the
government presented," 52 then the most striking feature of the new antitrust
decisions is the shift in the burden of proof regarding the probability of
anticompetitive effects of the merger and the requirement of an examination
of the particular market instead of reliance upon market-share percentages. 3
antimerger rulings." Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics,
Populism and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 326 (1968).
46. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
47. Comment, supra note 19, at 984; see 374 U.S. at 362.
48. 374 U.S. at 363-65. This sort of structural test forms the basis of the Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines, which define a "highly concentrated" market as one in which the
shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, and which set percentage
shares for acquired and acquiring firms above which the Department "will ordinarily challenge
" Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, I TRADE REG. REP. 4510, at 6884
mergers ...
(1975).
49. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
50. Id. at 275.
51. See note 37 supra.
52. Williams, supra note 34, at 968.
53. See Connecticut Nat'1 Bank, 418 U.S. at 669-70; Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at
631; General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498.
An exhaustive recent opinion in United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas.
61,033 (D. Md. 1976), relied on Marine Bancorporation to uphold the acquisition of a leading
manufacturer of gasoline-powered chain saws by the leading manufacturer of portable electric
tools. The court stated that a "trend away from exclusive reliance on concentration ratios and
" Id. at 69,574 n.27. See United States v. International
structural analysis [was] discernible ....
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Certainly the Burger Court has departed from precedents established by
the Warren Court in holding that sole reliance on concentration ratios to
demonstrate the lack of competition would be inadequate when the defendant
introduces evidence of competitive market conduct. 4 Both General
Dynamics and Marine Bancorporationsanctioned the introduction of evidence by the defendants showing that, given the particularcharacteristicsof
the markets involved, the Government's market-share statistics did not represent actual market power. The ability to use this evidence thereby undercuts
the determination in Philadelphia National Bank that a structural test of
concentration was sufficient to establish market power." One commentator
has concluded that Marine Bancorporation"graphically illustrates the present Court's unwillingness to accept, without evidentiary support, economic
theory and mere possibilities of anticompetitive impact as dispositive of a
section 7 case." 56 This apparent shift in the magnitude and burden of proof
required to establish a violation of section 7 should result in making more
difficult the successful pursuit of either governmental or private anti-merger
suits. The resulting escalation in the burden of proving that a merger "may
substantially lessen competition" within the meaning of section 7 was recognized and criticized by the dissenters in Marine Bancorporation.7
As to governmental enforcement activity, consideration of the possible
impact of the analysis presented by these new judicial decisions on the type of
situation dealt with in the two recent FTC decisions of In re The Budd Co. 58
and In re British Oxygen Co. 59 may be useful. In Budd the Commission
reversed an administrative law judge's initial decision that the acquisition of
the Gindy Manufacturing Corporation by The Budd Company violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.6" The Commission held that the acquisition by Budd
was a pro-competitive toehold acquisition6 in an industry dominated by
Harvester Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,028 (N.D. I1. 1976); United States v. Amax, Inc., 1975-2
Trade Cas. 60,590 (D. Conn. 1975); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 90-95 (D.
Colo. 1975). See also United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,046 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
54. See Comment, supra note 19, at 983.
55. Cf. the statement in General Dynamics that the "structure, history, and probable future"
of an industry was a more relevant concern than market shares. 415 U.S. at 498.
56. Robinson, supra note 34, at 254.
57. 418 U.S. at 642 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Justice
White's dissenting opinion.
58. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,998 (FTC 1975).
59. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 21,063 (FTC 1975).
60. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,857. The administrative law judge
found that Budd was one of the most likely potential entrants into the manufacture and sale of van
trailers, closed-top dry freight van trailers, open-top van trailers, and containers and container
chassis, and that, by acquiring Gindy, Budd eliminated itself as a substantial potential competitor
in these markets.
61. A "toehold" or "foothold" acquisition involves the purchase of a small competitor in
the market by a firm not presently in the market. For the development of the doctrine see
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 864-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1974); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974); Beatrice Foods Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 20,944 (FTC 1975); Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744,927 (1971), aff'd,
467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); Stanley Works, 78 F.T.C. 1023,
1072 (1971), aff'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972); Bendix Corp., 77 F.T.C. 731, 816
(1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). See generally P.
STEINER, supra note 19, at 273-76; Fox, Toehold Acquisitions, Potential Toehold Acquisitions
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 573 (1973); Comment, supra note 19, at
970-74; Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 156 (1972); 89 HARV. L. REV. 800 (1976).
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national companies. 62 The Commission established a general rule in potential
competition cases that "firms possessing no more than ten percent in a target
market. . . should ordinarily be presumed to be toehold or foothold firms." 63
The presumption is not conclusive, and the inference of lack of anticompetitive effects flowing from acquisition of such a firm can be rebutted in
particular cases. 64
In British Oxygen the Commission held that the acquisition by British
Oxygen Company of thirty-five percent of the stock of a United States
Company, Airco, Inc., violated section 7 by eliminating the acquiring manu65
facturer as a potential entrant in the United States industrial gases market.
The Commission stated that the acquisition also removed the British firm's
presence on the fringe of the market, which might have had some disciplining
effect on United States market prices in the future even though there was no
evidence of any such disciplining effect prior to the acquisition. 66 The
Supreme Court expressly reserved decision on whether an acquisition having
no immediate market effects except the elimination of a future entrant could
violate section 7.67
The approach of these two cases to the problems of dealing with the
entrance into a market of a firm which may be considered, at least in
hindsight, to have been a potential entrant is essentially one of minimizing
difficulties of proof. To the extent that the burden of proof is shifted to the
Government in such cases, serious difficulties will be encountered. As
Professor Posner has noted, "if the government is required to prove that in
fact the elimination of a given potential competitor altered the structure of
competition in the market it will always fail' 68 since we do not know how to
measure the entry costs of different firms or to establish reliably the perceptions of the firms in the market.
The alternative to requiring proof on these costs and perceptions is to adopt
presumptions. Thus far, the Government has been able to devise only the
presumption that the acquisition of a firm shows that the acquirer was
perceived, at the least, as more likely than other firms to enter the market by
internal expansion or toehold acquisition. Posner concluded that this presumption "is, if anything, contrary to the probabilities" and that a "more
sensible presumption would be that the acquiring firm was less inclined than
at least some other firms to enter the market by internal expansion. 69 Should
this contrary presumption be accepted, the chances of the Government's
62. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,854-55.
63. Id. at 20,857.
64. Id. The Commission did not, however, specify what rebuttability would entail. See 89
HARV. L. REV. 800,807(1976). As to burdens of proof see Fox, supra note 61, at 583-84; 89 HARV.
L. REV. at 805 & n.37.
65. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,924. The Commission's complaint
charged that the acquisition may substantially lessen competition in industrial gases, inhalation
therapy equipment, and inhalation anesthetic equipment. The administrative law judge sustained
these charges, together with an additional charge that certain prior agreements between British
Oxygen and Airco violated §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1970). See
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,907.
66. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,911-16.
67. Id. at 20,916-18; see note 20 supra.
68. Posner, supra note 2, at 324.
69. Id. (emphasis in original).
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prevailing in a potential competition suit would be virtually nil given the
difficulties of providing adequate proof.
Thus far, this Article has attempted to demonstrate the potential impact of a
"new economic realism" in certain areas of merger jurisprudence. A "new
economic realism" may have additional effects, however, which have not
been commonly realized. For example, an increase in the use of and reliance
upon economic data and concepts in decisions under section 7 may reveal that
the economic concepts and categories through which lawyers will try and
judges will decide merger cases are not widely accepted but rather are
subjects of serious dispute.
That the phrase "new economic realism" refers to the utilization of
economic data in antitrust decision-making in accordance with accepted
economic doctrine and concepts appears to be a common assumption. In
recent years, however, whatever developing scholarly consensus regarding
antitrust concepts that had existed has now given way to disputes in several
key areas. 70 The effect of the existence of such disputes among economists
concerning a wide range of important concepts has thus far apparently
escaped general notice. Nevertheless, in light of the decisions in General
Dynamics and MarineBancorporationthe presence of discordant views is of
great importance to the extent that the judiciary is consciously concerned
with realistically evaluating the economic effects of a corporate merger as a
means of testing the merger's legality under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 7'
While these controversies ultimately may have affected the judicial approach
of the Warren Court, they will have an impact much sooner than they
otherwise would have had and sooner than many may now suspect as a result
of the nature of the inquiry and apparent focus of concern of the "new
antitrust majority."
The basic theories underlying antitrust enforcement in recent years have
been derived from the structure-conduct-performance model developed by
industrial organization economists. 72 This model holds that the structure,
conduct, and performance aspects of an industry are closely linked to each
70. See Posner, supra note 37, at 149; cf. Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the
American Antitrust Laws' Economic Tests of Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 841 (1975).
71. To the extent that the courts and the enforcement agencies fail to deal with these
discordant views in antitrust decision-making, the system fails to meet a basic test of economic
rationality. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18, 34 (1968).

72. SeeJ.

BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION

(1956); J.

BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

(2d ed. 1968); J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1972); R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1967); C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959); W.
MUELLAR, A PRIMERON MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION (1970); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); W. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC
W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER (1975); Adams, The Case

WELFARE (1970);

forStructuralTests, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 13 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969).

Structure refers to those relatively stable and permanent characteristics of the industry, such
as number and makeup of industry members, industry concentration, and the nature and extent
of entry barriers. Conduct refers to the competitive business practices undertaken by the
members of a particular industry. Finally, performance refers to the economic results produced
by an industry with desirable economic performance generally being identified with the maximum output of goods, at the lowest prices, with technological progressiveness and efficiency,
and a full rate of employment. See Mueller, The New Antitrust: A "Structural" Approach, 12
VILL. L. REV. 764, 766 n.7 (1967).
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other; the model focuses on market structure "because the structure deter-

mines the behavior [conduct] of firms in the industry, and that behavior
[conduct] in turn determines the quality of the industry's performance." 73
The-conclusion based on this model has been that "an industry which does not

have a competitive structure will not have competitive behavior."

74

Argu-

ably, this model has provided the theoretical basis for such recent structural
antitrust cases as the actions by the Federal Trade Commission against the
four major cereal companies 75 and the eight leading petroleum companies, 76

and the complaint brought by the Department of Justice against American
Telephone and Telegraph. 77 Increasingly, however, the structural model has
been perceived to be less than a satisfactory explanation of industrial organi78
zation and behavior.
The structural approach holds that when concentration reaches a certain
level, the effects on competition will be adverse. 79Inorder to determine what
the competitive effect of any acquisition might be in section 7 cases, numerical measures of concentration have increasingly come to be relied upon by
courts, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice. The
measure of economic concentration most frequently used by lawyers and

economists in horizontal merger cases is the four-firm concentration ratio.80
73. R. CAVES, supra note 72, at 17.
74. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours&Co., 351 U.S. 377,426(1956) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
75. Kellogg Co., No. 8883, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
19,898 (FTC
1972); see Mueller, Advertising, Monopoly, and the FTC's Breakfast Cereal Case: An "Attack on
Advertising," 6 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 59 (1973); Comment, Oligopoly and the FTC: "The
Best to You Each Morning," 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 602 (1972).
76. Exxon Corp., No. 8934, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,388 (FTC
1973).
77. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 2416, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,074
(D.D.C. 1974).
In addition to this enforcement activity, the structural model has provided the framework for
such legislative efforts at restructuring as the Industrial Reorganization Act, introduced by
Senator Philip A. Hart several years ago, and reintroduced this past Congress. See S. 3832, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1959, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
The proposed legislation is intended to break into smaller units many large corporations in
concentrated markets. The bill would declare presumptively unlawful any four or fewer firms
having 50% or more of the sales in a relevant market in the three years preceding the filing of a
complaint. The only defenses to court-ordered divestiture under such circumstances would be to
show either that the defendant's market share had been achieved solely through the ownership of
valid patents, lawfully acquired and used, or that divestiture would result in a loss of substantial
economies. In addition, an Industrial Reorganization Commission, which would be established to
prosecute violations of the Act, would study and develop plans for the reorganization of seven
broadly defined industries. See generally Hart, Restructuring the Oligopoly Sector: The Case for a
New "'IndustrialReorganization" Act, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 35 (1972); Note, The
Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust Proposal to Restructure the American Economy, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 635 (1973). The proposal has been severely criticized, see, e.g., Handler,
Antitrust- Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 211,256-61 (1975), and its
enactment is doubtful. See BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 717, at A- Il (June 10, 1975).
See also Blake, Legislative Proposals for Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 340 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).

78.

See Posner, supra note 37, at 149. For a concise review of the criticisms of the structural

model see Weston, Structure, Performance, Behavior, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS MERGERS 67
(J.Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969). See also 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 226-28 (1975); Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About
Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann

& J.Weston eds. 1974); cf. Weston, Implications ofRecent Research for the Structural Approach
to Oligopoly, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 623, 624, 631-33 (1972).
79.
80.

(1975).

See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 669-82 (2d ed. 1974).
See Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, I TRADE REG. REP.

4510, at 6884
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This is a percentage figure representing the aggregate market share of agiven
number of leading firms in an industry, generally the percentage of the market
accounted for by the top four firms. One commentary has observed that:
the structure of this ratio is so simple and intuitively appealing that there
has never been a satisfactory analysis of its utility for resolving antitrust
issues. This omission has become increasingly important as the Court has
come to rely more heavily
on economic statistics interpreted through
81
concentration ratios.
Should a "new economic realism" become a major influence in decisions in
merger cases, the difficulties in measuring competitive effects through the
use of the four-firm concentration ratio or, indeed, through other possible
measures, become even more significant as avoiding detailed consideration
of which of the several alternative measures is appropriate in a particular case
will be difficult.
There are several disadvantages to the four-firm concentration ratio as the
measure of concentration. The ratio does not reflect changes in the market
shares of the four leading firms when their aggregate market share remains
unchanged, or changes involving the market share of the remaining firms in
the industry when their aggregate share remains unchanged. Yet, these
changes can be of considerable economic importance.82 For example, two
industries may show the same ratio, even though in the first industry the top
four firms are of equal size, while one or two large firms may dominate in the
second industry. Similarly, the remaining market may be divided among few
or many firms. The competitive behavior of firms in such markets will differ
considerably even though in all cases the first four firms may have the same
aggregate percentage share. The use of the four-firm concentration ratio to
measure a single change in firm sizes resulting from an acquisition presents
other difficulties, as the ratio reflects only an arbitrarily chosen number of
firms. 83 The four-firm concentration ratio thus has "fundamental defects
when used to measure either economic trends or the effects of a single
84
horizontal merger. Other suggested measures of concentration, 85 including, for example, the
Herfindahl index, 86 are superior because they reflect both relative and
81. Finkelstein & Friedberg, The Application of an Entropy Theory of Concentrationto the
Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1967).
82. Id.at 680.
83. Id.
84. Id.at 682-83. See also B. BOCK, CONCENTRATION, OLIGOPOLY AND PROFIT: CONCEPTS VS.
DATA 15-16 (1972).
85. Various alternative measures of concentration include: the Lorenz curve, which takes
into account the total number of firms in an industry and shows the percentage of total industry
sales (or some other variable) accounted for by any given fraction of the total company
production; the Gini coefficient, which measures the departure between the Lorenz curve
actually observed and the curve which would appear if all firms had equal market shares or sales;
and the relative mean deviation intercept, which measures the extent to which the assets of each
member firm differ from the assets of the average-sized firm in the industry or the mean value of
the total industry assets. These alternative measures are discussed and evaluated in P. ASCH,
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA

150-58 (1970); D. NEEDHAM, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 83-96 (1969); F. SCHERER, supra note 72, at 50-57; E.
SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 136-56 (1968); Marfels, A Bird's Eye View of Measures of
Concentration,20 ANTITRUST BULL. 485 (1975).
86. The Herfindahl index is a concentration measure that takes into account both the number
of firms and the size inequality among the firms. It is defined as:
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absolute concentration and are not dramatically affected by the entry or exit
from the market of a firm of negligible size. Several theorists have suggested
that the degree of market power and the probability of anti-competitive

behavior will be influenced by the degree of size disparity among oligopolistic
firms.87 They conclude that:

size inequality among large firms in an industry is an important structural
element because it can affect the degree of oligopolistic interdependence
and discipline. Significant disparity in size among the large firms influ-

ences the degree of dominance which the largest firm or firms exercise
over the price and output decisions of the other firms. In other words,
size disparity can
88 be expected to affect the nature of competitive forces

in the industry.

A measure of concentration which does take into account the size inequality
among the leading firms in an industry has been considered to be "a more

discriminating index of concentration.'89
An illustration of how the use of a different measure of concentration may
affect the legality of corporate mergers may be useful. A merger by an already
dominant firm automatically increases concentration in the market and leads
to a change in the size inequality among those dominant firms. If a substantial
reduction in size inequality results, a court, arguably, should approve the

merger on the grounds that less asymmetry produces greater rivalry, with the
9°
increased rivalry acting as a trade-off against the increase in concentration.
Such an approach is particularly useful when a market is dominated by one or

two large firms and when even the next largest firms are forced to consolidate
in order to maintain their competitiveness. For the courts to make this
judgment, however, requires the application of a measure of concentration
which is sensitive to such considerations. 91
The question of the appropriate measure of concentration was addressed
directly in only one case prior to GeneralDynamics and Marine Bancorporation. In that case, In re Litton Industries, Inc.,92 the Federal Trade Commis2

H = y(x/X)
xi isthe size of firm i(in terms of value of shipments, assets, or any other market base) and X is the
total size of the industry, the market base held by all firms. As Asch states: "In other words, the
Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of the size of each firm in an industry, where firm size
is expressed as a percentage of the industry; that is, the sum of the squares of the market share of
each firm." P. ASCH, supra note 85, at 155 (emphasis in original); see F. SCHERER, supra note 72,
at 51-52; E. SINGER, supra note 85, at 152-54.
87. See Hexter& Snow, Mergers, Asymmetry and Antitrust, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 404 (1974).
See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 423 (1974).
88. Hexter & Snow, supra note 87, at 404; cf. Ramsay, Asymmetry, Entropy and Policy: A
Comment, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 759 (1975).
89. See B. BOCK, supra note 84, at 17; R. POSNER, supra note 87, at 423; F. SCHERER, supra
note 72, at 51-52; Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225, 228

(1966).
90. See Hexter & Snow, supra note 87, at 419.
91. See id. It should be noted that the Herfindahl index is extremely insensitive to the market
effect of small firms. See P. ASCH, supra note 85, at 156; Finkelstein& Friedberg, supra note 81,
at 706-07.
92. 82 F.T.C. 793 (1973). Subsequent to the Court's decisions in General Dynamics and
Marine Bancorporation the defendants in United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 1976-2
Trade Cas. 61,033 (D. Md. 1976), advocated use of the Herfindahl index in lieu of four-firm
concentration ratios. The Herfindahl index showed a trend to decline in concentration in the
relevant market. The court declined to use the Herfindahl index stating:
The critical problem with the Herfindahl index, aside from its non-recognition by
courts which have uniformly used concentration ratios and its concomitant lack
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sion ordered a large conglomerate corporation to divest itself of an acquired
competing manufacturer of typewriters.93 The hearing examiner had dismis-

sed the complaint, stating that under the Herfindahl measure of concentration
the effect of the merger on market concentration was insignificant." The
traditional two- and four-firm concentration ratios were rejected as a "fal-

lacy" which leads to "misleading and erroneous conclusions" since there
were firms with extremely high market percentages in both of the relevant
lines of commerce." Reversing the decision of the hearing examiner, the
Commission concluded that no compelling reason existed to ignore the
traditional four-firm concentration ratio analysis which was "well suited for
the purpose of merger law enforcement.' '96 The decision in Litton Industries
was later modified, with the result that the acquired manufacturer did not
have to be divested. 97 No specific comment was made upon whether the

Commission's view on the proper measure of concentration had changed.
The Commission stated, however, that "no significant increase in concentration" resulting from the retention of the acquired manufacturer was then
seen, and observed that the relevant markets would remain dominated by a
single firm. 98

Once the degree of market concentration has been assessed, consideration
must be given to the implications arising from that market concentration. At
one time, a generally accepted proposition was that if one seller had at least

twenty to twenty-five percent of the sales in his market, a serious danger
existed that the market price would be above the competitive level. 99 The
of comparability to data from earlier authority, is that one or two firms could have
sizable market shares but if enough small, insignificant firms existed, the market
could appear relatively deconcentrated. The competitive effect of these small
firms might well be marginal, but the Herfindahl index by reflecting them, could
significantly distort by underestimation the market power of the leading firms.
Id. at 69,577 n.38. Given that the Herfindahl index is extremely insensitive to the market effect of
small firms, the court's analysis and conclusions appear highly questionable. See note 91 supra.
93. 82 F.T.C. at 1014-15.
94. Id. at 969-70.
95. Id. at 904-07.
96. Id. at 1010.
97. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,854, at 20,713 (FTC 1975).
98. Id. at 20,718.
99. SeeC. KAYSEN& D. TURNER, supranote72, at 133; Bok, supra note 6, at 308-16,328. See
also J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to
Entry and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960, 48 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 296
(1966); MacAvoy, McKie & Preston, High and Stable Concentration Levels, Profitability, and
Public Policy: A Response, 14 J.L. & ECON. 493 (1971); Weiss, Quantitative Studies in Industrial
Organization, in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS 363, 371 (M. Intriligator ed. 1971);
Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING 184 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
Rhoades notes, however:
There is widespread agreement, among students of industrial organization, that
industry concentration is an important determinant of industry profit performance. Unfortunately, neither economic theory nor existing empirical evidence is
clear as to the nature of the concentration-profitability relationship.
Rhoades, The Concentration-Profitability Relationship: Policy Implications and Some Empirical Evidence, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 333, 354 (1973). For additional commentary see Winn &
Leabo, Rates of Return, Concentration and Growth-Question of Disequilibrium, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 97 (1974). A considerable number of recent studies have cast doubt on the significance of
the relationship between profits and concentration or prices and concentration. See H. DEMSETZ,
THE MARKET CONCENTRATION DOCTRINE (1973); Peltzmar., Profit Data and Public Policy, in
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 128 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969); Demsetz, supra note
78; Handler, supra note 77, at 223-29. Professor Brozen has concluded that there "is no
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premise that "competition is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers,
none of which has any significant market share," which formed the basis of
the statistical shortcut approved by PhiladelphiaNational Bank, was found
by Justice Brennan to be "common ground among most economists."'0 As
Professor Posner has noted, "this scholarly consensus has collapsed."''
While much economic literature may be found in support of the proposition
that a concentrated market will invariably result in anticompetitive
behavior, 10 2 many recent examinations by economists have cast doubt on the
validity of this proposition,' 013 and, at the very least, the proposition "is open
to legitimate debate." " It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will
now permit the defendant in a horizontal merger case to show that the

relevant market, though concentrated, behaves not anti-competitively as
dictated by economic theory, but in a highly competitive fashion, "and
whether such proof is sufficient to rebut the PhiladelphiaNational Bank
presumption that an increase in concentration tends to substantially lessen
competition." "'0 Nevertheless, Justice Powell's citation in MarineBancorporationof General Dynamics for the principle that the degree of concentration
does not always reflect the way the market as a whole actually behaves may
1°6
allow for the introduction of such evidence.
There are many other areas of controversy, concerning the appropriate
17
The entire doctrine of
economic tests of legality under the antitrust laws.
relationship between profitability and concentration" and that "[c]oncentrated industries are
concentrated because that, apparently, is the efficient way to organize those industries."
Brozen, Concentration and Structural and Market Disequilibria, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 241, 242,
248 (1971); see Brozen, Significance of Profit Data forAntitrust Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
MERGERS 110 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969); Brozen, The Antitrust Task ForceDeconcentration Recommendation, 13 J.L. & ECON. 279 (1970); Brozen, Bain's Concentration and Rates
of Return Revisited, 14 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1971); Brozen, The Persistence of "High Rates of
Return" in High Stable Concentration Industries, 14 J.L. & ECON. 501 (1971); Brozen, Concentration and Profits: Does Concentration Matter?, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 381, 386 (1974). But see
Wenders, Deconcentration Reconsidered, 14 J.L. & ECON. 485 (1971); Wenders, Profits and
Antitrust Policy: The Question of Disequilibrium, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 249 (1971). For a recent
discussion by several distinguished analysts and practitioners see generally Concentration:
Issues, Convictions and Facts (Conference Bd. Information Bull. No. 9, Aug. 1976).
100. 374 U.S. at 363.
101. Posner, supra note 2,at 312; see W. LEONARD, BUSINESS SIZE, MARKET POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY 61 (1969): "The behavior of an industry solely on the basis of its concentration
ratio .cannot be presumed. In each instance, the record [of the industry] must be consulted."
102. See note 72 supra.
103.

See note 99 supra. See also J. MCGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION

(1971).
104. Robinson, supra note 34, at 252.
105. Id.
106. 418 U.S. at 631; see United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas.
61,033, at 69,574 (D. Md. 1976).
107. See, e.g., the controversy regarding the character and legality of oligopolistic pricing,
and the desirability and practicability of oligopolistic pricing suits. Compare Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962), with Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); see Markovits, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman
A ct, and Economic Welfare, Part I, Oligopolistic Price and Oligopolistic Pricing: Their Con ventional and Operational Definition, 26 STAN. L. REV. 493 (1974); Part I1,Injurious Oligopolistic
Pricing Sequences: Their Description, Interpretation, and Legality Under the Sherman Act, 26
STAN. L. REV. 717 (1974); Part III, Proving (Illegal) Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the
Necessary Evidence and a Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27
STAN. L. REV. 307 (1975); Part IV, The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1975). Professor Posner has vigorously attacked
Markovits' series of articles in Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and
Economic Welfare-A Reply to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1976). On the other
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potential competition, for example, has come under severe attack by many as
providing neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis "for believing that the
elimination of a specific potential competitor has ever affected the price level
of a market." 108 No particular resolution of these various economic controversies is urged; rather, an attempt has been made to point out these
disputes in an effort to illustrate that conflict exists concerning very fundamental concepts which are relied upon in the antitrust analysis of merger
cases.
A "new economic realism" by courts in anti-merger cases will both
stimulate the use of economic data concerning market characteristics by
defendants in antitrust litigation and demonstrate the current limitations of
economic analysis for the antitrust area.'°9 A proper response by antitrust
specialists to the challenges posed by a "new economic realism" is the
exercise of greater creativity than has been characteristic of the antitrust bar
heretofore. Professor Posner has commented:
Whereas the lawyers for the Justice Department have been ingenious in
proposing new theories of liability, the defense bar has been on the whole
timid and unimaginative in proposing alternative theories of business
behavior and standards of liability. The typical defense posture in a case
is to accept the theoretical basis of the Government's position but try to
show that the defendant did not in fact commit the act complained of. As
a result, the Government's constant pressure to expand the grounds of
antitrust liability has met little resistance from the defense bar."'
hand, Professor Spence agrees with Markovits' conclusions that "the nature of competitive
interaction in an industry is determined by a rich collection of structural features of markets,"
and that "competition is multidimensional, occurring in many dimensions other than price
.... "Spence, Markovits on Imperfect Competition, 28 STAN. L. REV. 915, 918 (1976); see
Markovits, A Response to ProfessorPosner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919 (1976); Cf. Asch, Collusive
Oligopoly: An Antitrust Quandary, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 53 (1969).
A similar controversy has emerged recently with respect to the proper definition and analysis
of anticompetitive pricing behavior under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), pertaining
to actual or attempted monopolization. The difficulties of legal and economic analysis discussed
regarding oligopolistic market structures also apply to monopolistic markets treated under § 2.
See F. SCHERER, supra note 72, at 165; cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966). Compare Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricingand Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975), with Scherer, PredatoryPricingand the Sherman
Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); see Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory
Pricing,89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on PredatoryPricing,89 HARV.
L. REV. 901 (1976). See also MacIntyre & Volhard, Predatory Pricing Legislation: Is It
Necessary?, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1 (1972); Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the
Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 506, 515-23 (1974); Turner, supra note 19, at 1339-52;
Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations,122 U. PA. L. REV.
1439, 1467-79 (1974); Yamey, PredatoryPrice Cutting:Notes andComments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129
(1972). This controversy over the proper analysis of predatory pricing is reflected in the cases.
CompareInternational Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,723-25 (5th Cir.
1975), with Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698-703 (1967), and United
States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34 (1963), andNational Dairy Prod. Corp. v.
United States, 350 F.2d 321, 327-30, 335-36 (8th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1966).
108. Posner, supra note 2, at 324. See Dunfee & Stern, PotentialCompetition Theory as an
Anti-Merger Tool Under Section 7of the Clayton Act: A Decision Model, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 821,
851-52 (1975); Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of
Horizontaland Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wis. L. REV.
658.
109. For a stimulating discussion of those limitations see Adams, Market Structure and
Corporate Power: The Horizontal Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1280 (1974); Blake, ConglomerateMergers and theAntitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555,
561 (1973).
110. Posner, supra note 2, at 326-27.
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To the extent that a determination of illegality under section 7 is made
following an examination of particular market characteristics which may
indicate the presence of competition, as in General Dynamics, defense
counsel has the opportunity to present to the Court economic evidence and
concepts not yet a part of merger jurisprudence. For example, there is some
evidence which suggests that there are significant pro-competitive consequences of entry into a market through mergers. II Similarly, scholarly
112
thinking on the costs of preventing mergers is also in a state of flux.
Measures of concentration other than the traditional four-firm ratio may be
suggested as more appropriate in particular contexts." 3
Whether the Supreme Court's decisions in General Dynamics and Marine
Bancorporationin fact represent a significantly different approach to section
7 of the Clayton Act is by no means clear. To the extent that they do represent
a changed outlook, however, several significant consequences are apparent.
An attempt has been made herein to outline the nature and impact of some of
these possible consequences, and to suggest that an emphasis on economic
realism may inevitably hasten the reconsideration of several fundamental
economic concepts which traditionally have provided the categories for
antitrust analysis.

I 1l. See F. SCHERER, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION 385 (1975); Dunfee &
Stern, supra note 108, at 845-47; Williamson, supra note 71, at 33.
112. See McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 55 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974); Posner, supra note 2, at
312.
113. See text accompanying notes 82-91 supra.

